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CURTAIN CALL AT CLOSING: THE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL
LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA
IRENE C. LU*
ABSTRACT
The mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute those most responsible for the 1994
Rwandan genocide is drawing to a close after nearly two decades.
This Comment analyzes the substantive, structural, memorial, and
symbolic inheritance that the ICTR bequeaths to international
criminal law. This unique area of international law is not only
judge-made, but also developed through the norms and
conventions of states, alongside the rich participation of nongovernmental actors and international policy-making agencies that
define what norms become law. Given this reality, the multidimensional legacy of the Tribunal is fundamentally important in
determining the forward movement of an area of law where such
extra-legal influences are indeterminately determinative. This
Comment argues that, for all of the Tribunal’s flaws, and despite
being originally set forth as a very specific type of criminal justice
mechanism with a limited mandate and narrow jurisdiction, the
ICTR has managed to further the field of international human
rights through its perhaps unexpected contributions to memory,
imagination, and hope at the heart of human rights.
1.

INTRODUCTION

Between 500,000 and 1,000,000 people in Rwanda were killed in
the short span of approximately 100 days between April 6 and
mid-July of 1994 in one of the most brutally efficient and horrific
massacres in history.1 On November 8, 1994, the International
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Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was created by Security
Council Resolution 955 under Chapter VII2 of the United Nations
Charter for the “sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible
for genocide and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law”3 in the belief that establishment of the Tribunal
and its prosecutions would “contribute to the process of national
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.”4
Thus, from its very founding, the ICTR was mandated to
selectively prosecute those most responsible for the Rwandan
genocide in the hope that these prosecutions would promote
restorative justice to victims in Rwanda and reconciliation between
Tutsis and Hutus in communities fractured by violence and
bloodshed. The Security Council, in Resolution 1503, laid out the
Completion strategy of both the ICTR and its sister Tribunal, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), calling on
both Tribunals to complete all trial activities by 2008 and all work
by 2010, which was later extended to 2011.5 With Resolution 1966
in December 2010, the Security Council also provided for the
creation of a residual Mechanism that would continue the
jurisdiction and manage the rights, obligations, and essential
functions of the Tribunals.6 Nearly two decades since its inception,
after completing seventy-five cases, seventeen of which are

man Rights Fellowship for supporting the Author’s legal internship in the Judicial
Chambers of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, between May and August 2011; and finally, the staff and editorial board of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law. All errors remain with the
Author.
1 The history and unfolding events of the Rwandan genocide are widely documented. See, e.g., ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE
IN RWANDA (1999); PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW
WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA (1998); GÉRARD
PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE (1995); ROMÉO DALLAIRE,
SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2003).
2 See U.N. Charter arts. 39–51 (regarding the Security Council’s enforcement
powers).
3 S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
4 Id. at 1.
5 S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); S.C. Res. 1534, ¶
3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004); S.C. Res. 1966, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1966 (Dec. 22, 2010).
6 S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 5.
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pending appeal and twelve of which are acquittals,7 nine accused
still at large, and after referring two accused to France8 and eight to
Rwanda,9 the Tribunal is finally closed. The Arusha branch of the
ICTR’s residual Mechanism began operations officially on July 1,
2012; its opening marked the formal transfer of the Tribunal’s
outstanding work and the official and symbolic closure of the
ICTR’s doors.10 The ICTR is the first of the ad hoc Tribunals to
close,11 heralding the end of the era of ad hoc courts. This era has
7 Of the completed cases, nine were guilty pleas and seventeen cases are on
appeal. See Status of Cases, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/
Cases/StatusofCases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2013).
8 Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, Case No. ICTR-2005-85-I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of Laurent Bucyibaruta’s Indictment to France (Nov.
20, 2007); Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-87-I, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka’s Indictment to
France (Nov. 20, 2007).
9 Prosecutor v. Ndimbati, Case No. ICTR-95-1F-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of the Case of Aloys Ndimbati to Rwanda (June
25, 2012); Prosecutor v. Ryandikayo, Case No. ICTR-95-1E-R11bis, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the case to the Republic of Rwanda (June 20,
2012); Prosecutor v. Munyagishari, Case No. ICTR-5-89-R11bis, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the Case to the Republic of Rwanda (June 6,
2012); Prosecutor v. Ntaganzwa, Case No. ICTR-96-9-R11bis, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Request for Referral of the Case to the Republic of Rwanda (May 8,
2012); Prosecutor v. Sikubwabo, Case No. ICTR-95-1D-R11bis, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the Case to the Republic of Rwanda (Mar. 26,
2012); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-01-67-R11bis, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (Feb. 22, 2012); Prosecutor v. Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-75-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s
Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (June 28, 2011); Prosecutor v.
Munyarugarama, Case No. MICT-12-09-AR14, Decision on Appeal against the Referral of Phénéas Munyarugarama’s Case to Rwanda and Prosecution Motion to
Strike (Oct. 5, 2012). See also infra note 28. Rwanda abolished the death penalty in
2007 because the ICTR otherwise refused to transfer genocide suspect detainees to
Rwanda’s jurisdiction under Rule 11bis of the Tribunal’s Completion Strategy that
allows for transfer of cases to national jurisdictions. Rwanda Abolishes Death Penalty, AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 2, 2007), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-andupdates/good-news/rwanda-abolishes-death-penalty-20070802.
10 Judge Khalida Rachid Khan, President of the ICTR, Address to the United
Nations Sec. Council: Six Monthly Report on the Completion Strategy of the ICTR
(Dec. 7, 2011); Press Release, ICTR, Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) begins work in Arusha, ICTR/INFO-9-2-725.EN, (July 2, 2012), available at http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=1298.
11 This includes the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY)
mandated to close in 2013, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) targeted to
complete appellate proceedings in the case of Charles Taylor in late 2013 and close
soon afterwards, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) with targeted closure in
2015, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) to close
at an unspecified time. See infra note 139 (noting the completion of the ICTY’s
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arguably also passed with the creation of the permanent standing
International Criminal Court (ICC) that has the jurisdiction to
prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
within the territory of its signatory states.12
As the work of the ICTR has wound down and now, with a
record of nearly two decades behind it, the Tribunal is ripe for an
assessment of its legacy.13 Indeed, the Tribunal itself has been

mandate and the transfer of its residual obligations and functions to the Mechanism on July 13, 2013); Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/PRST/2012/21 (Oct. 9, 2012); see Ban Ki-Moon, Letter dated Feb. 16, 2012
from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2012/101 (Feb. 17, 2012) (extending the mandate of the Tribunal for
three years, from March 1, 2012 to March 1, 2015); see Law on the Establishment of
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, as amended,
Reach Kram No. NS/RKM/1004/006, art 47 (Oct. 27, 2004) (Cambodia), available
at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/KR_Law_as_
amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf (explaining that “the Extraordinary Chambers in
the courts of Cambodia shall automatically dissolve following the definitive conclusion of these proceedings”).
12 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 arts. 5–8. At the first Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the
ICC held in Kampala, Uganda, on June 11, 2010, amendments to the Statute were
adopted that define the crime of aggression and set forth the conditions under
which the Court will exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. However, the
Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over crimes of aggression any earlier than January 1, 2017, with at least ratification of the Amendment by 30 states and activation
of the jurisdiction by consensus action or a two-thirds vote. Review Conference of
the Rome Statute, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court on the Crime of Aggression, U.N. Doc. RC/Res.6, Annex I (June 11, 2010).
13 See Leila Nadya Sadat, Henry H. Oberschelp Professor of Law, Washington
Univ. Sch. of Law, Lecture at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The
Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (July 3, 2012) (arguing
that the Tribunal’s lack of indictment of Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) members
is not a “fatal flaw” in its legacy, but that its residual Mechanism now needs to
undertake legacy work); Gabrielle McIntyre, The International Residual Mechanism
and the Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 923 (2011) (arguing that the U.N. Security Council has enabled the Judges of the residual Mechanism with the necessary tools to
conduct proceedings of the highest standards); Adama Dieng, Capacity-Building
Efforts of the ICTR: A Different Kind of Legacy, 9 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 403 (2011)
(arguing that the ICTR has a different, lesser-known legacy in its capacitybuilding efforts and dissemination of public information to Rwandans); Catharine
A. MacKinnon, The ICTR’s Legacy on Sexual Violence, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L. & COMP.
L. 211 (2008) (stating that the Tribunal’s legacy includes substantive law, law of
criminal responsibility, and the process of expanding world attention under international law on violations of sexual violence); Nigel Eltringham, “A War Crimes
Community?”: The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Beyond
Jurisprudence, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 309 (2008) (determining that the Tri-
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concerned with the question of how it will be remembered and
judged.14 Assessments of its legacy cannot be free of the rubric of
the original intent encompassed within its chartering mandate—to
prosecute those most responsible for the genocide, to promote
reconciliation, and to deter future crimes. All the same, its legacy
must also reflect the Tribunal’s immeasurable and perhaps
intangible influence that will nevertheless have important
repercussions for transitional justice and the culture of norms
respecting human rights. In this sense, assessing the Tribunal’s
legacy is a much more expansive endeavor than simply assessing
its contributions or its failures, about which there is much
scholarship and criticism.15
This Comment argues that the ICTR’s legacy is multidimensional. The ‘substantive’ legacy that the ICTR leaves is the
landmark international criminal and humanitarian case law
generated over the past two decades, which has been the
traditional focus of the overwhelming majority of analyses of the
Tribunal’s work and laudable contributions. However, to only
address its contributions that are most obviously related to its
function and raison d’être would be neglectful of the other
important, and perhaps unforeseen and unanticipated,
contributions that the Tribunal may have made. That is, the
Tribunal’s legacy would not be complete without a discussion of
other processes that the Tribunal has generated or set in motion.

bunal’s legacy also includes the personal and professional experiences of its practitioners).
14 See Judge Dennis Byron, President of the ICTR, Address to the United Nations Security Council: Six Monthly Report on the Completion Strategy of the
ICTR (Dec. 6, 2010) (“As our Tribunal, in its current form, draws to a close, we
should all redouble our efforts to ensure its lasting legacy as a beacon for international justice.”).
15 See Luc Reydams, Let’s Be Friends: The United States, Post-Genocide Rwanda,
and Victor’s Justice in Arusha (Working Paper, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2197823 (arguing that the Tribunal was
doomed from the start as a court of ‘victor’s justice,’ in part because of support
from the United States for the RPF and Paul Kagame); Lars Waldorf, “A Mere Pretense of Justice”: Complementarity, Sham Trials, and Victor’s Justice at the Rwanda Tribunal, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1221 (2010) (arguing that the ICTR Prosecutor’s failure to prosecute RPF crimes is a harbinger for how “complementarity” will play
out at the ICC); Peter Erlinder, The U.N. Security Council Ad Hoc Rwanda Tribunal:
International Justice or Juridically-Constructed “Victor’s Impunity”? 4 DEPAUL J. SOC.
JUST. 131 (2010) (“The ICTR’s one-sided prosecution threatens the legitimacy of the
ICTR and calls into question all of its findings . . . .”).
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This Comment argues that the Tribunal’s legacy encompasses
not only its substantive, but also what can be categorized as its
structural, memorial, and symbolic heritage. The ‘structural’
legacy of the ICTR is the functional institutional heritage of a
particular type of ad hoc, time-bound international criminal court
structure and the unique residual Mechanism set up to manage the
rights, obligations, and essential functions of the Tribunal.16 The
structure of the Tribunal has had a direct impact on the judicial
creativity and rich ‘laboratory’ of international law that has been
generated by the Tribunal. The ‘memorial’ legacy of the ICTR
consists of the narratives generated through trials and in
interviews of witnesses and victims, which add to the historical
record and understanding of the genocide, which in turn,
arguably, give voice to the memory and remembrance at the heart
of collective responsibility. Finally, ‘symbolic’ legacy is what the
presence of the ICTR for the past two decades has meant in the
public imagination: a representation of the ideals of international
justice, accountability, and the reach of the rule of law to all corners
of the world over perpetrators of egregious crimes against
humanity in order to end their impunity. It also encompasses the
significance of what it means for an ad hoc court to close and for its
symbolism to be extinguished. This Comment argues that
altogether, the multi-dimensional legacy of the Tribunal is
fundamentally important in determining the forward movement of
an area of international law where such extra-legal influences are
indeterminately determinative in generating a culture of norms
fundamental to the respect and protection of human rights.17
To be fair, not all of the Tribunal’s legacy is necessarily
positive; to argue so would be to disregard the Tribunal’s
shortcomings.18 Part 2 of this Comment describes the political and
realpolitik constraints on the Tribunal’s operations that have
haunted the Tribunal since its inception. These political constraints
on the functioning of the Tribunal have contributed to the mixed

S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 5.
Though it is important not to conflate human rights and international humanitarian law (the “law of war” or “law of armed conflict”), humanitarian law is
increasingly reflecting the influence of the human rights field through a “growing
convergence . . . the blurring of thresholds of applicability, and the expansion of
both systems . . . .” Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM.
J. INT’L L. 239, 240–42, 266–73 (2000).
18 Id.
16
17

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/10

LU (DO NOT DELETE)

10/29/2013 6:37 PM

2013] MULTI-DIMENSIONAL LEGACY RWANDA TRIBUNAL 865
reviews of its impact and will ultimately influence the final
assessment of its legacy. This Comment also lays out the definition
with which to analyze ‘legacy’ and argues that this definition must
include the enduring influence of the Tribunal’s work and
processes on the ideals, conceptions, and instrumentalities of
justice and human rights. Part 3 of this Comment will give an
overview of the major substantive legacy of the Tribunal in the
area of international criminal law, where the ICTR’s jurisprudence
has been generally recognized as most innovative and where it has
changed the definitions of key legal concepts such as ‘genocide,’
‘crimes against humanity,’ and ‘sexual violence.’ Part 4 of this
Comment will analyze the structural legacy of the Tribunal by
focusing on the effects of the Tribunal’s unique, time-bound
lifespan on judicial creativity, and discuss the mechanisms that it
has employed to bring its mandate to a close. This Part also
considers the lessons that this process holds for the closure of other
international criminal tribunals. Part 5 will analyze the memorial
legacy of the Tribunal by describing the Tribunal’s contributions to
the generation of a record of the genocide that is necessary to
collective memory and responsibility. Finally, Part 6 will focus on
the symbolic legacy of the Tribunal by analyzing the contributions
of the Tribunal to public imagination through its performance of
justice and what it has stood for in nearly two decades. This
Comment ends with concluding thoughts on the still evolving
legacy of the Tribunal as its merits continue to be contested and
mediated in the years ahead.
2. THE FRACTIOUS BIRTH OF THE ICTR AND REALPOLITIK
IMPLICATIONS FOR ITS INSTITUTIONAL ‘LEGACY’
What is a “legacy”? In the context of international tribunals,
one scholar has noted that:
Legacy can be defined as a . . . lasting impact, most notably on
bolstering the rule of law in a particular society by conducting
effective trials while also strengthening domestic capacity
to do so. It includes the extent to which a court has had a
“demonstration effect” by modeling best practices in handling
the individual cases and compiling a historical record of the
conflict. Legacy should also lay the groundwork for future efforts
to prevent a recurrence of crimes by offering precedents for
legal reform, building faith in judicial processes, and
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Similarly, the 2008 UN High Commissioner’s Report on
maximizing the legacy of hybrid courts also defines ‘legacy’ as a
“lasting impact on bolstering the rule of law in a particular society,
by conducting effective trials to contribute to ending impunity,
while also strengthening domestic judicial capacity. The aim is for
this impact to continue even after the work of the . . . court is
complete.”20 The Report continues to assert that the need for
tribunals to leave a legacy is “now firmly accepted as part of
United Nations policy,” citing the Secretary General’s 2004
statement that “it is essential that, from the moment any future
international or hybrid tribunal is established, consideration be
given, as a priority, to the ultimate exit strategy and intended
legacy in the country concerned.”21 These definitions of the legacy
of international tribunals focus narrowly on the legal legacy
generated by their legal processes, that is, the impact that effective
trials will have on domestic judicial and legal institutions, and
whether they can deter impunity worldwide. However, in
focusing only on the legal, these definitions of legacy miss the rich
and varied influences that the tribunal can leave in other areas that
also fundamentally affect the pursuit of justice and human rights.
Professors King and Meernik, in assessing the work of the
ICTY, have developed the following four-pronged framework for
describing the core missions in the ICTY’s mandate “to bring to
justice those responsible for serious violations” of international
humanitarian law: (1) developing the Tribunal’s functional and
institutional capacities; (2) interpreting, applying, and developing
international humanitarian and criminal law; (3) attending to and
interacting with the various stakeholders who have vested
interests; (4) promoting deterrence and fostering peace-building to

19 Caitlin Reiger, Where to from Here for International Tribunals? Considering
Legacy and Residual Issues, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, Sept.
2009, at 1, available at http://ictj.org/publication/where-here-internationaltribunals (italics added).
20 OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR
POST-CONFLICT STATES: MAXIMIZING THE LEGACY OF HYBRID COURTS, at 4–5, U.N.
Doc. HR/PUB/08/2, UN Sales No. E.08.XIV.2 (2008).
21 Id. (citing to UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, The
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies, U.N. Doc.
S/2004/616, ¶ 46).
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prevent future aggression and conflict.”22 Their goal in developing
this framework was to delineate a “more explicit conceptualization
and methodology for assessing the Tribunal’s impact” given its
mandate.23 This framework is also applicable to the ICTR as it was
charged with the same mandate, but with the addition of
promoting national reconciliation in Rwanda that can be
categorized under the third prong of the framework as attending to
various stakeholders. King and Meernik’s framework is a starting
point for this Comment’s assessment of the Tribunal’s legacy,
which encompasses all of the factors within the framework.
Here, it is important to delineate the difference between impact
and legacy.
The former addresses a temporally bound
consequence of the Tribunal’s work within demarcated sectors of
influence, while the latter refers to a temporal and contextindependent conception of influence and perception that may be
less directly associated with the sectors with which law and justice
are traditionally associated. Ultimately, legacy is a more expansive
assessment of institutional influence than impact.
In this
Comment, ‘legacy’ will be defined as the enduring influence of the
Tribunal’s work and processes on the ideals, conceptions, and
instrumentalities of justice and human rights.
In assessing the ICTR’s legacy, it is important to situate the
Tribunal within the constraints of international and regional
politics and acknowledge the reality of these constraints on its
functioning during its operations and on its final legacy.24 First,
while the idea of setting up an international criminal tribunal to
prosecute high-ranking genocide suspects first came at the request
of Rwanda,25 it later withdrew its support for the creation of the
Tribunal over major disputes regarding three issues: the temporal
jurisdiction that the Tribunal would have; its proposed location
outside of Rwanda; and the lack of a death penalty for the worst
offenders of the genocide under the international law of the
Tribunal when, paradoxically, lower-level offenders were subject

22 Kimi L. King & James D. Meernik, Assessing the Impact of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Balancing International and Local Interests
While Doing Justice, in THE LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 7, 8 (Bert Swart et al. eds., 2011).
23 Id. at 11.
24 See generally Reiger, supra note 19.
25 VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS:
VIRTUAL TRIALS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE COOPERATION 158 (2008).
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to the death penalty in Rwandan courts under its penal code.26 The
ICTR’s narrow temporal and geographical jurisdiction is the 1994
calendar year (January 1 to December 31) for crimes committed
within the territory of Rwanda and crimes committed in
neighboring countries by Rwandan citizens.27 Specifically, this
limited temporal jurisdiction was the result of the Security Council
member states’ tense negotiations with Rwanda. During these
negotiations, Rwanda pushed hard (i) to advance the start date of
the Tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction in order to cover those
responsible for organizing the genocide during a “long period of
[prior] planning”28 and (ii) to limit the boundaries of this temporal
jurisdiction, thus making it impossible for the Tribunal to
prosecute atrocities by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and
post-genocide revenge killings against Hutu génocidaires and
civilians.29 Since the genocide, the RPF has dominated Rwanda’s
government under the leadership of Paul Kagame, who became
Vice President and Minister of Defense immediately after the
genocide and then President in March 2000.30 At the Security
Council meeting concerning the establishment of the Tribunal, the
Rwandan representative lodged his country’s strong opposition to
locating the Tribunal outside of Rwanda, noting that the location of
the Tribunal was essential

26 Rwanda’s death penalty sentence originates in Organic Law No. 08/1996
of August 31, 1996, on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences constituting
the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity committed since October 1,
1990
(Rwanda),
available
at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b4f64.htm, was later repealed under Organic Law No. 31/2007 of July 25, 2007, relating to the Abolition of the
Death Penalty (Rwanda). See Victor Peskin, Conflicts of Justice - An Analysis of the
Role of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 6 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 128, 132
(2000) (“[T]he death penalty lies at the heart of what it means to deliver justice for
victims and survivors of the genocide.”).
27 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955,
art. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
28 U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994), in
VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 2 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA 298, 308 (1998) (including a speech of the Rwandan delegate to the
United Nations following a vote to create the ICTR).
29 PESKIN, supra note 25, at 162 (“[T]he tribunal’s narrow temporal mandate
compromised the court’s capacity to deter and prosecute post-1994 atrocities
committed by both the RPF and the exiled génocidaires.”).
30 Biography, PAULKAGAME.COM, http://www.paulkagame.com/2010/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48&Itemid=54&lang=en (last visited
Jan. 23, 2012).
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to teach the Rwandese people a lesson, to fight against the
impunity to which it had become accustomed . . . and to
promote national reconciliation. It therefore seems clear
that the seat of the International Tribunal should be set in
Rwanda; it will have to deal with Rwandese suspects,
responsible for crimes committed in Rwanda against the
Rwandese.31
The representative argued that the lack of capital punishment
for those who “devised, planned and organized the genocide” was
“not conducive to national reconciliation in Rwanda.”32 By a quirk
of fate, Rwanda sat as a non-permanent member of the Security
Council during deliberations and it ultimately cast the sole
dissenting vote in the Security Council against the establishment of
the Tribunal.33
Rwanda’s opposition to the Tribunal, both initially and later,
underscores the politics of war crimes tribunals and the state
cooperation that is vital to the functioning of an international
criminal court with no inherent powers.34
The Tribunal’s
dependence on state cooperation was exacerbated by its structural
arrangement whereby the movement of its witnesses and
investigators was directly dependent on a state with, at times,
radically diverging interests. For example, on the morning of June
7, 2002, a group of witnesses testifying for alleged Hutu génocidaires
arrived on the tarmac at Kigali International Airport for a two-hour
flight to the courtrooms of the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania—only to
find that Rwanda had deliberately instituted travel restrictions that
blocked them from leaving the country.35 As one commentator
noted, “[t]he wheels of international justice ground to an abrupt
halt until August, when the Rwandan government finally allowed
witnesses to travel to the tribunal.”36 Against the backdrop of
Rwanda’s obstruction of the Tribunal’s legal processes was thenICTR Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte’s decision in December
U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, supra note 28, at 308.
Id.
33 Id. at 299.
34 See PESKIN, supra note 25, at 7 (describing the "soft power" [of tribunals] as
“the capacity to affect change in the behavior of external actors by a multiplicity of
strategies that do not depend on actual enforcement” and the vulnerability of tribunals as a result of the lack of enforcement powers).
35 Id. at 3.
36 Id.
31
32
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2000 to expand ICTR investigations into RPF atrocities,37 followed
by her outspoken criticism of Rwanda’s non-compliance with her
request,38 and finally her warning that she would issue indictments
against RPF soldiers by the end of 2002.39 Ultimately, no
indictments were ever made against RPF soldiers by Del Ponte or
her successors, in part because of the recognition that to do so
would likely impair the Tribunal’s ability to carry out its work.40
The Tribunal’s failure to prosecute Tutsi RPF atrocities committed
by the then-rebel force of the current Rwandan President Paul
Kagame, and to instead focus only on Hutu perpetrators of the
genocide, has unfortunately tainted the Tribunal’s work with
aspersions that it renders only “victor’s justice.”41
The Rwandan government’s animosity and strategically
obstructionist policy toward the Tribunal, the Tribunal’s limited
temporal jurisdiction, and its distant location from the people for
whom justice was supposed to be garnered—compounded later by
the Tribunal’s limited outreach to inform Rwandans of its
activities42—would foreshadow some of the major problems and
critiques that have persistently dogged the Tribunal.43 Views of

Id. at 207.
See id. at 208 (noting that this first public criticism “marked the beginning
of an escalating confrontation with [Rwanda’s] government”).
39 Id. at 207–31 (addressing the Security Council on Oct. 30, 2002, to “thwart
Rwanda’s counter-shaming campaign against the tribunal”).
40 See id. at 228 (“[ICTR Prosecutor Hassan] Jallow’s current sidestepping of
the RPF issue may be a strategic gambit designed to forestall conflict with the
Rwanda government and secure its ongoing cooperation.”). In 2009, Jallow announced that he would not indict RPF soldiers for the reported killings of 30,000
Hutus in 1994. U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134
(June 4, 2009). See also Letter from Human Rights Watch to ICTR Chief Prosecutor
Hassan Jallow (Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/
2009/08/14/letter-ictr-chief-prosecutor-hassan-jallow-response-his-letterprosecution-rpf-crime (requesting that the ICTR Chief Prosecutor prosecute RPF
crimes committed in 1994 in order to “stand against impunity and to ensure accountability for these crimes”).
41 Leslie Haskell & Lars Waldorf, The Impunity Gap of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda: Causes and Consequences, 34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
49, 51 (2011).
42 But see Adama Dieng, Capacity-Building Efforts of the ICTR: A Different Kind
of Legacy, 9 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 403, 405 (2011) (describing the Tribunal’s “capacity-building legacy that consists of workshops, trainings, and the dissemination of
public information” which has an impact on the daily lives of Rwandans).
43 See generally Waldorf, supra note 15 (detailing the problems of complementary national trials with international tribunals, namely that the national proceedings are shams and international justice is inherently political); Haskell & Wal37
38
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the Tribunal within Rwanda at different times have ranged from
indifference or apathy, since trials are “remote from most ordinary
people, both geographically and socially,” to opinions that the
Tribunal is a “blatantly biased and evil institution” that “maintains
an oppressive regime and silences the violence of which the Hutu
were victims.”44 Moreover, the reconciliation at the heart of the
ICTR’s mandate may not have come to pass as many Rwandans
choose the strategy of deliberate forgetting rather than
reconciling,45 perhaps partly because the formal and impersonal
nature of structured trials may fail to address specific public health
needs generated by mass violence.46 As one scholar has argued,
“[b]y denying the legitimacy and social authority of ‘local
determinations’ with their critical and constructive potential,
international criminal jurisprudence often sacrifices the possibility
of reconciliation for the normative framework entailed by
dorf, supra note 41 (discussing the negative consequences of the ICTR’s failure to
prosecute RPF atrocities such as leaving a “legacy of ‘victor’s justice,’” painting an
“inaccurate and incomplete picture” of Rwanda in 1994, and setting a “bad precedent for international justice”).
44 Peter Uvin & Charles Mironko, Western and Local Approaches to Justice in
Rwanda, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 219, 222, 225 (2003). See also Timothy Longman et
al., Connecting Justice to Human Experience: Attitudes Toward Accountability and Reconciliation in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE
AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 206 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004)
(conducting a 2002 study of over 2000 Rwandans in four communes, which found
“[s]trong support for the idea that the ICTR should be held in Rwanda and the
evidence that people feel ill-informed about the ICTR may indicate that people
support gacaca because it is closer to them and therefore more transparent. A substantial portion of people also responded that they were not informed about the
[ICTR] Rwandan trials . . .”).
45 See, e.g., Susanne Buckley-Zistel, Remembering to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a
Strategy for Local Coexistence in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 76 AFRICA 131, 131 (2006)
(arguing that the lack of post-conflict social transformation has led to chosen amnesia as a deliberate form of coexistence for Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, but that
this coping mechanism “bears the danger of not challenging the social cleavages
that rendered the genocide possible in the first place, and so obstructing their
transformation in the future”). But see HUM. RTS. WATCH, RWANDA: JUSTICE
COMPROMISES: THE LEGACY OF RWANDA’S COMMUNITY-BASED GACACA COURTS 95-98
(2011),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/rwanda0511webwcover_0.pdf
(pointing to some Rwandans who use gacaca trials in order to advance revenge
motives and settle old scores that may or may not be genocide-related).
46 See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, supra note 28, at 302 (including a speech, directly following voting on the Resolution that created the ICTR, by the Czech Republic’s representative to the United Nations declaring that “[j]ustice is one thing;
reconciliation, however, is another. The Tribunal might become a vehicle of justice, but it is hardly designed as a vehicle of reconciliation”).
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retribution.”47 Where the ICTR has attempted to support domestic
initiatives at building the capacity of Rwandan courts and its legal
system, this attempt has also arguably been met with resistance
and opposition, and seen limited returns.48 It is not surprising that
in a different, but problematic parallel process to the trials of the
ICTR, Rwanda’s domestic gacaca (Kinyarwanda for “grass”) courts
modeled on traditional local community customs to resolve
conflicts, are more immediately relevant to Rwandans.49 This is
perhaps because the Rwandan Government expressly aimed to
encourage community participation and to “make ordinary
Rwandans the main actors in the process of dispensing justice and
fostering reconciliation” where they are not at the ICTR.50 It is also
likely that the sheer number of cases—1.2 million—that have been
tried since 2005 in more than 12,000 community-based courts
involving countless participants, make the gacaca process far more
relevant to Rwandans than the distant trials at the ICTR.51
Ultimately, the history of the ICTR has been marred by tensions
between its competing stakeholders: the international community
and Rwandans.52
Specifically, within the framework that King and Meernik
conceptualized are two sets of constituencies broadly identified:
international and local, under each of which are multiple sets of
stakeholders to whom the Tribunal is responsible.53 Here, the
international community is broadly defined as major state powers,
national governments, intergovernmental organizations, and
47 Jason Benjamin Fink, Deontological Retributivism and the Legal Practice of International Jurisprudence: The Case of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
49 J. AFR. L. 101, 102 (2005). See also MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 26 (1998) (discussing the lexicon of potential responses to collective violence, and specifically,
the failure of trials to facilitate reconciliation since “[r]econciliation is not a goal of
criminal trials except in the most abstract sense”).
48 See Dieng, supra note 42. See also S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 5 (calling “on
the international community to assist national jurisdictions, as part of the completion strategy, in improving their capacity to prosecute cases transferred from the
ICTY and the ICTR . . .”).

49 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 45 (stating the achievements and failures
of the gacaca courts and “the use of gacaca to settle personal and political scores,
corruption, and procedural irregularities”).
50 Id. at 2.
51 Id. at 1.
52 Id.
53 See King & Meernik, supra note 22, at 7, 11–14.
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nongovernmental organizations, whose members are principally
concerned with the interpretation of international humanitarian
laws, and the effectiveness and efficiency while doing so.54 The
local constituency are those who were “victims, villains, or
bystanders in the atrocities committed,” and for whom “interests
are more intensely personal” and complicated by often conflicting
goals, especially across ethnic groups where conflict was divided
along those lines.55 King and Meernik argue that institutional,
political, and practical constraints, coupled with limits on its
powers, mean that, in reality, the ICTY is not able to respond to its
constituents in the former Yugoslavia.56
Similarly, the bifurcation of ’constituencies‘ is also appropriate
in the case of the ICTR that—perhaps more starkly than the ICTY
vis-à-vis the former Yugoslavia—has straddled the divide between
its international character and efforts at helping Rwandans in the
process of recovering, rehabilitation, restoration, or the
combination thereof. Also, similarly, the ICTR has arguably not
achieved its broad and vaguely stated goals for its local
constituency because of institutional, political, and practical
limitations. This Comment focuses mainly on the ICTR’s legacy to
the international community, in recognition that the Tribunal as a
vehicle for reconciliation and social mending may have been
impracticable from the start, hindered by regional politics and
international realpolitik; perhaps this had always existed as a
secondary goal assumed to be the natural by-product of punishing
perpetrators, and of doing justice. Moreover, as King and Meernik
argue, where local and international interests conflict, “the
preponderance of influence tends to reside with actors and
interests at the international level” because the ICTY (and ICTR)
are subject to the oversight of the UN, a relationship similar to that
of principal-agent.57 The Tribunal’s likely failure to address the
needs of one important group of its ’stakeholders,’ Rwandans, is
acknowledged here.
However, this Comment argues that the Tribunal’s impact has
been profound despite its shortcomings, and also outside of its
contributions to substantive international law. This impact, such

54
55
56
57

Id.
Id. at 12.
See generally id.
Id. at 13–14.
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as deterrence, norms building, strengthening the rule of law, and
respect for human rights, is not discrete and measurable, nor can
its causality necessarily be traced and isolated.58 However, this
impact, where it lasts and continues to influence future institutions
as well as legal, social, and political norms, becomes a legacy. This
Comment suggests that the ICTR’s contributions in the following
areas will become its multiple legacies.
3.

SUBSTANTIVE LEGACY OF INNOVATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE

The substantive legacy of the ICTR is comprised of its major
contributions to the development of international criminal law
jurisprudence. This contribution is one area of the Tribunal’s
legacy about which a voluminous amount of literature has been
generated.59 This Part of the Comment will focus on the Tribunal’s
most significant, precedent-setting contributions.
At the very outset, it is important to note that, as a formal
matter, the ICTR’s ability to make these substantive and creative
contributions originated in its use of the category—‘general
principles of law‘—a well-known source of international law, in
crafting legal doctrine.60 While these general principles are
thought to represent a subsidiary source of law, the ICTR, much
like other international criminal tribunals, has needed to use it in
order to fill gaps and generate clear principles from unclear rules
and statements of law.61 In so doing, it departed from the practices

58 See THEODOR MERON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE
VIEW FROM THE BENCH 150 (2011) (“It is very difficult to establish a direct causal
link between the verdicts of international criminal tribunals and increased respect
for international humanitarian law. Nonetheless, I believe there is a correlation
between the founding and work of the various international criminal tribunals in
the 1990s and early 2000s and the increased attention given to international humanitarian law by armed forces.”).
59 See, e.g., JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
(Shane Darcy & Joseph Powderly eds., 2010) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CREATIVITY]
(documenting many of these contributions in individual essays); NICHOLAS A.
JONES, THE COURTS OF GENOCIDE: POLITICS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN RWANDA AND
ARUSHA 132–55 (2010) (detailing the jurisprudential contributions of the ICTR);
Erik Møse, Main Achievements of the ICTR, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 920, 920 (2005) (describing the principal achievements of the ICTR).
60 Fabian O. Raimondo, General Principles of Law, Judicial Creativity, and the
Development of International Criminal Law, in JUDICIAL CREATIVITY 45, supra note 59,
at 45.
61 Id. at 46.
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of other non-ad hoc tribunals.62
Of the ICTR’s substantive
contributions, three in particular deserve special mention and
analysis: (i) its construction of the crime of ‘genocide’; (ii) its
contribution to the jurisprudence of sexual violence; and (iii) its
expansion of the crime of incitement.
3.1. The Meaning and Definition of ’Genocide’
Article 2(2) of the ICTR statute defines the crime of genocide.63
One of the unique features of the definition is its insistence on
establishing a special intent, or a “dolus specialis.”64 It is this
requirement that takes the act of killing from being an ordinary
crime to an international one.65 The ICTR’s case of Prosecutor v.
Akayesu66 in 1998 was the first conviction for genocide by an
international court.67
Jean-Paul Akayesu was charged with
genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions for his role as the bourgmestre of Taba
commune, where at least 2000 Tutsis were killed and numerous
women were subject to multiple acts of sexual violence.68 Akayesu,
as mayor of the commune, executed executive functions, exercised
exclusive control over the communal police and gendarmes at the
disposition of the commune, and held responsibility for the
execution of laws and the administration of justice.69 In the
Judgment, the Tribunal paid special attention to the problems
inherent in proving genocide and, recognizing this issue,
established that the special intent for genocide did not require only
direct evidence, but “can be inferred from a certain number of
presumptions of fact,” and “the general context of the perpetration
of other . . . acts directed against that same group.”70 This ruling
marked a major advance in the jurisprudence of genocide by

Id.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 27,
art. 2(2).
64 Payam Akhavan, The Crime of Genocide in the ICTR Jurisprudence, 3 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 989, 992 (2005).
65 Id. at 992–93.
66 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998).
67 JONES, supra note 59, at 138.
68 Akayesu, supra note 66, § 1.2 Indictment.
69 Id. § 1.2, ¶ 4.
70 Id. ¶ 523.
62
63
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providing prosecutors and tribunals with a workable mechanism
for satisfying the special intent component of the definition.
A second contribution of the Akayesu judgment was in its
understanding of who constituted a ’group‘ for the crime of
genocide.71 The definition of genocide requires establishing that
certain actions were committed against “a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group.”72 Since the Tutsi were ethnically and
linguistically identical to the Hutu in Rwanda, they were incapable
of meeting the express requirements of the definition.73 The ICTR
in Akayesu viewed the definition’s categories as non-exhaustive
and concluded that the crime could apply to any group that was
“stable and permanent.”74 In so doing, it effectively put to rest the
threshold question of whether genocide had been committed in
Rwanda as a matter of international law.
Emboldened by this interpretation, later panels of the ICTR
have adopted similarly creative and purposive approaches to
interpreting a “group” in the definition of genocide, with the
understanding that failing to do so would result in a fundamental
miscarriage of justice.75
3.2. The Jurisprudence of Sexual Violence
Arguably, the ICTR’s biggest substantive contribution lies in its
contribution to the understanding of sexual violence when actively
employed during a conflict.76 During the course of the Rwandan

Akhavan, supra note 64, at 999.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 27,
art. 2(2).
73 Akhavan, supra note 64, at 1000–1.
74 See Akayesu, supra note 66, ¶ 701. The Chamber also noted that there were
“a number of objective indicators of the group as a group with a distinct identity”
including, reference by the Rwandan Constitution and Civil Code in force at the
time, the Arusha Accords, customary rules, self-identity and subjective perception. Id. ¶ 170.
75 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T,
Judgment, ¶ 98 (May 21, 1999) (adopting expansive definitions of ethnic, racial,
and religious groups); see also Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3-T,
Judgment, ¶ 376 (Dec. 6, 1999) (concluding that the Tutsi group is “characterized
by its stability and permanence” and thus constitutes a distinct group protected
by the Genocide Convention).
76 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, The ICTR’s Legacy on Sexual Violence, 14 NEW
ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 211 (2008) (discussing the accomplishments and shortfalls
of the ICTR’s treatment of sexual violence); Rebecca L. Haffajee, Prosecuting Crimes
of Rape and Sexual Violence at the ICTR: The Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise
71
72
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genocide, rape was systematically committed on a massive scale,
where between 250,000 and 500,000 rapes were estimated to have
been perpetrated; “rape was the rule and its absence the
exception,” U.N. Special Rapporteur Réne Degni-Ségui concluded
in his Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda.77
Akayesu is also the same watershed case for the redefinition of the
crime of sexual violence in conflict. Specifically, in the Taba
commune where Jean-Paul Akayesu was bourgmestre, hundreds of
displaced civilians were taken hostage by local militia and/or
communal police and often subjected to multiple incidences of
sexual violence, sometimes by multiple assailants and frequently
accompanied by torture and death.78 Originally, charges of sexual
violence and rape were not part of the indictment against Akayesu
despite overwhelming evidence of such, but on questioning by
Judge Navanethem Pillay of South Africa, the only female judge at
the ICTR at the time, rape became front and center at the trial and
garnered the encouragement of women’s groups. The trial was
suspended and delayed in order for the Prosecutor to amend the
indictment to include charges of sexual violence.79
In its final judgment, the Tribunal noted that “rape is a form of
aggression and that the central elements of the crime of rape
cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body
parts.”80 The Tribunal instead defined the crime of rape as “a
physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive” and defined sexual violence as
“any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under

Theory, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 201, 202 (2006) (arguing for the “targeted use of
[joint criminal enterprise] theory in effectively prosecuting crimes of rape and
sexual violence at the ICTR”).
77 See Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Rep. on the
Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/68 (Jan. 29
1996) (by René Degni-Ségui) (noting that “[r]ape was systematic” during the massacres).
78 See Akayesu, supra note 66, § 1.2, (charging Jean Paul Akayesu with being
responsible, as bourgmestre (mayor), for the killing of 2,000 Tutsis in Taba).
79 See When Rape Becomes Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1998, at A10 (“[In making rape part of Mr. Akeyesu’s [sic] genocide conviction, the decision also advances the world’s legal treatment of rape and sexual violence.”); see also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-I, Amended Indictment, ¶ 12B (Jan. 1, 1996)
(charging that Jean Paul Akayesu knew that acts of sexual violence were being
committed).
80 See Akayesu, supra note 66, ¶ 687.
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circumstances which are coercive.”81 Here, the Tribunal effectively
dispensed with the need to show the absence of consent
independently, making it perhaps the most groundbreaking
advance in gender jurisprudence worldwide82 given how
meaningless consent is in circumstances of conflict.83 The Tribunal
further noted that “[s]exual violence is not limited to physical
invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not
involve penetration or even physical contact,” explicitly referring
to the incident where Akayesu ordered militia to undress a female
student and made her perform gymnastics in a public courtyard, as
constituting an act of sexual violence.84 Here, the Tribunal made
clear that “coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a
show of physical force. Threats, intimidation, extortion and other
forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation may constitute
coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances.”85
This broad definition of coercion is not only reflective of the reality
that consent is meaningless in the circumstances of extreme
inequality, such as those acts of a sexual nature with a nexus to
armed conflict, genocide, and campaigns of crimes against
humanity, but also “portentously” suggests that contexts of
inequality are located along a continuum of settings that may not
yet be “recognized as systematic, widespread, or group-based.”86
In addition to expanding the definitions of the crimes of sexual
violence and rape, the Tribunal in Akayesu also became the first to
recognize that acts of sexual violence when committed in

Id. ¶ 598.
See Kelly D. Askin, A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes in International Courts and Tribunals: 1993 to 2003, 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 16, 17 (2004) (reflecting
that the Akayesu case was groundbreaking because it explicitly recognized rape
“as an instrument of genocide and a crime against humanity” for the first time in
history).
83 See ANNE-MARIE L.M. DE BROUWER, SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE ICC AND THE PRACTICE OF THE ICTY AND THE ICTR 455
(2005) (discussing how “with regard to the definition of rape, the ICC EoC [Elements of Crimes] do not focus on the issue of non-consent, but rather on force,
threat of force, coercion or a coercive environment”); MacKinnon, supra note 76, at
212 (noting that the Tribunal’s greatest substantive accomplishment was its definition of rape and acknowledgment that “consent is meaningless”).
84 See Akayesu, supra note 66, ¶ 688.
85 Id.
86 MacKinnon, supra note 76, at 212–13.
81
82
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furtherance of genocide could themselves amount to acts of
genocide.87
The decisions in several subsequent cases, including Prosecutor
v. Semanza, Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, and Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, all
described only the physical elements of the act of rape as set out in
Kunarac, and seemed to shift their analyses away from the
conceptual definition established in Akayesu.88 However, the
Tribunal in the case of Prosecutor v. Muhimana reiterated its
definition of rape used in Akayesu and found the accused guilty of
rape as a crime against humanity.89 The significance of the
Tribunal’s efforts in the area of criminalizing sexual violence are
borne out in the fact that the ICC treaty came to abandon the idea
of consent in its own definitions of rape and enforced prostitution,
and instead absorbed the definition created by the ICTR wherein
the element of consent is irrelevant and absent.90
More recently, in June 2011, in the case of the Prosecutor v.
Nyiramasuhuko, the Tribunal convicted a woman for the first time
in the history of international criminal law91 for genocide, crimes
against humanity, and for the instigation of rape as a crime against
humanity.92 That women do participate in and perpetrate horrific
acts of sexual violence during conflict is well-documented.
However, that they are held responsible for their participation or

See Akayesu, supra note 66, ¶¶ 674–75.
Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶
506 (May 15, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-T, Judgment
and Sentence, ¶ 912 (Dec. 1, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR 9954A-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 707 (Jan. 22, 2004).
89 See Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR 95-1B-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 501, 563 (Apr. 28, 2005) (“[A]n accused incurs criminal liability if he
causes serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.”).
90 See MacKinnon, supra note 76, at 212 n.4 (describing that “taking advantage
of a coercive environment” is a form of force recognized in the ICC definitions of
rape and enforced prostitution as crimes against humanity).
91 Nyirmansuhuko was the first woman convicted by an international tribunal, but Biljana Plavšić, a former President of Republika Srpska and a professor at
the University of Sarajevo, had entered into a plea bargain with the ICTY on December 16, 2002 to one count of crimes against humanity for her part in targeting
Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and other non-Serb populations of thirty-seven
municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. See generally Prosecutor v. Plavšić,
Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing Judgment (Feb. 27, 2003) (describing her
crimes and sentencing).
92 Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR 98-42-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 6200 (June 24, 2011) (finding Nyiramasuhuko guilty on seven counts of
the Indictment).
87
88
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incitement of sexual violence is more rare. This lack of conviction
is likely because women have seldom held such positions of
control and authority as did Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, who was
appointed, ironically, as the Minister of Family and Women’s
Development in the Interim Government of Rwanda.93 This ICTR
decision again symbolizes the Tribunal’s breaking of new grounds
in judicial decision-making in the area of sexual violence,
demonstrating that no one—man or woman—is immune from
judgment. As noted legal scholar of sexual violence and gender
crimes, Professor Catharine MacKinnon poignantly observes:
No shortfall can overshadow the ICTR’s biggest
accomplishment, one it shares with the survivors of sexual
atrocities: expanded world attention under international
law to these violations . . . . And it has been in the ICTR, not
in the ICTY, that it has truly begun . . . . This legacy, among
many others, can never be erased.94
3.3. The Crime of Incitement
The third major advance that the ICTR made in the
jurisprudence of international criminal law is in the case of
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, also known as the Media Case.95 The case
involved the prosecution of three individuals, two of which were
actively involved in operating the infamous Milles Colline radio
station in Rwanda that broadcasted messages relating to the
extermination of Tutsis and identified specific targets for
violence.96 The defendants were convicted for the crimes of direct
and public incitement to commit the crime of genocide, and for
persecution as a crime against humanity.97 In developing these
crimes, the ICTR drew liberally from the international law on hate
speech.98 It recognized the media to have caused the acts of
genocide directly, and was able to attribute these actions to the

Id. ¶ 244.
MacKinnon, supra note 76, at 220.
95 See Muhimana, supra note 89.
96 Id. ¶¶ 8, 9.
97 Id. ¶¶ 1105–08.
98 Id. ¶ 980. For a first-hand account by the Author of the opinion discussing
the motivation behind the Tribunal’s approach, see Navanethem Pillay, Freedom of
Speech and Incitement to Criminal Activity: A Delicate Balance, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 203, 208–09 (2008).
93
94
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defendants.99 In so doing, the Tribunal likened the media to the
“bullets” in a gun that were loaded with messages of ethnic hatred
and violence.100 The defendants were found to be directly guilty,
and their words were not treated as mere instrumentalities, but
rather as deeds in and of themselves designed to kill.101
The Tribunal’s logic behind its opinion and expansion of the
law is well-captured by its observation that “[t]he power of the
media to create and destroy fundamental human values comes
with great responsibility. Those who control such media are
accountable for its consequences.”102 On appeal, the Tribunal’s
Appeals Chamber confirmed the lower court’s approach to the
crime in large measure.103 While some have since questioned the
legitimacy of the Tribunal’s approach and claimed that its
jurisprudence applied a new crime to the defendants
retroactively,104 others have considered it an important mechanism
to hold individuals in control of mass media accountable for their
actions. The significance of the decision is in its signaling that
“hate speech can constitute international law’s most heinous
crimes” independently.105
***
Though the Tribunal is associated with other substantive
contributions—such as its decisions on the “nexus” requirement
for crimes against humanity106 and its procedural rules on trying
99 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence,
¶¶ 952–53 (Dec. 3, 2003).
100 See id. ¶ 953 (finding three media executives guilty, inter alia, of genocide,
direct and public incitement to genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide).
101 Id. ¶ 974–75.
102 Id. ¶ 945.
103 Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 775 (Nov. 28, 2007).
104 See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Criminalizing Hate Speech in the Crucible of
Trial: Prosecutor v. Nahimana, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 17, 17–33 (2005) (describing the opinion as troubling, unpersuasive, and raising issues of retroactive
justice).
105 International Law—Genocide—U.N. Tribunal Finds That Mass Media Hate
Speech Constitutes Genocide, Incitement to Genocide, and Crimes against Humanity—
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze (Media Case), 117 HARV. L. REV.
2769, 2769 (2004).
106 See John Cerone, The Jurisprudential Contributions of the ICTR to the Legal
Definition of Crimes Against Humanity—The Evolution of the Nexus Requirement, 14
NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 191, 191 (2008) (arguing that among the ICTR’s most
significant contributions to the jurisprudential development of international criminal law is the “evolution of the notion of Crimes Against Humanity and the nec-
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multiple accused at one trial107—the above-mentioned are
significant in terms of the Tribunal’s contributions to the
jurisprudence of international criminal law.
Indeed, their
significance is borne out by the immense impact that they have had
and by most predictions will continue to have in the future
development of international criminal law.
4.

STRUCTURAL LEGACY OF A TRANSIENT TRIBUNAL

The Tribunal was set up intentionally as an ad hoc tribunal with
a finite life span. This time-bound structure is unique in the
functioning of a court because “in ordinary contexts, courts are not
temporary” and their permanence is the very basis of their
legitimacy and source of authority.108 However, the ICTR did not
have permanence as the basis for its legitimacy and source of
authority. Instead, the Tribunal had only the variable financial
support of the Security Council and the dubious weight of moral
authority at the time.109 This Section argues that the explicit
bounded temporality of the ICTR fostered an environment ripe for
judges to engage in creative lawmaking, because they readily
recognized the fleeting nature of their opportunity to use the
events of the genocide to contribute to the development of the
general body of international criminal law. With limited time, and
nothing to lose, so to speak, they were freed to transcend the
traditional barriers to judicial lawmaking such as: deferring to law
made by other agencies, limiting themselves to explicitly
prescribed sources of law, and limiting decisions to the narrow
facts at hand—and were thereby able to enlarge the very
boundaries of international criminal law.
essary link between individual crimes and the broader attack that raises such
crimes to the level of international regulation”).
107 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52T, Judgment and
Sentence, ¶ 953 (Dec. 3, 2003).
108 See Reiger, supra note 19, at 1. See also Guido Acquaviva, Was a Residual
Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals Really Necessary?, 9 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 789, 790-91 (2011) (“[T]he elaboration of the so-called ‘completion strategies’
of both ad hoc Tribunals, should have probably led to profound reflections on the
special nature of courts of law endowed with a limited temporal jurisdiction from
the outset.”).
109 See HANS KÖCHLER, GLOBAL JUSTICE OR GLOBAL REVENGE?: INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 166–71 (2003) (arguing that the ICTY and
ICTR fell short of the basic separation of powers necessary for fairness and impartiality in functioning because of the Security Council’s extensive role in its creation).
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The very idea of international criminal justice is in tension with
the bedrock principle of state sovereignty because the former
purports to have direct applicability to individuals in states who
are in turn subject to those states’ exclusive sovereignty.110
Antonio Cassese, former President of the ICTY and first President
of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, made an apt observation in
noting that international law is an edifice built on the volcano of
state sovereignty.111 Judge Cassese argues that international law
should endeavor to “build devices to withstand the seismic activity
of states: to prevent or diminish their pernicious effect” in
“demolish[ing] the very bricks and mortar from which the Law of
Nations is built.”112 Furthermore, he cautions that “the [T]ribunal
must always contend with the violent eruptions of state
sovereignty: the effect of states’ lack of cooperation is like lava
burning away the foundations of the institution.”113 In particular,
Judge Cassese was referring to the ICTR and ICTY’s lack of
enforcement powers and their need to rely entirely on the
cooperation of states for executing their orders.114 However, this
general warning principle explains just as well the tensions
between the expansion of international criminal law, which, to be
truly universal, must limit state sovereignty.
At its heart,
international criminal law tests the very validity of international
law by trumping or limiting state sovereignty.115
At its inception, the ICTR was restricted by the Security
Council in the sources that it could look to when deciding cases; it
was allowed to apply customary international law and
international treaties binding on Rwanda at the time of the
genocide.116 This limit—largely analogous to, but less restrictive
than what the Security Council also placed on the ICTY117—
110 See ANTONIO CASSESE, THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
SELECTED PAPERS 424–25 (2008) (discussing the difficulties of enforcing international human rights law owing to state sovereignty).
111 Id. at 425 (quoting German legal scholar Theodor Niemeyer).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 425–26.
115 Winston P. Nagan, International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for
Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 127, 128 (1996).
116 Mia Swart, Judicial Lawmaking at the ad hoc Tribunals: The Creative Use of the
Sources of International Law and “Adventurous Interpretation,” 70 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 459, 461 (2010).
117 Id.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

LU (DO NOT DELETE)

884

10/29/2013 6:37 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 34:4

originated implicitly in the Security Council’s principle of
restricted delegation of powers, limiting the role of judges and
courts to avoid having them “legislate” the law, and instead
merely interpreting and applying it, or iudicis est ius dicere sed non
dare.118 Despite this general principle, judicial lawmaking in the
international context is often inevitable. When confronted with a
situation where there is no clear pre-existing rule, judges routinely
make new rules or modify existing law to formulate a new rule.119
Moreover, judges are tasked with deciding actual cases, and when
faced with inadequate or insufficient law, find themselves forced to
develop the law in order to meet their mandate of reaching a
decision.120 This process proved to be fundamentally true of the
ICTR and its jurisprudence. In the aforementioned Akayesu case,
for example, the Tribunal based its decision almost entirely on a
“conceptual approach” in the face of few (or no) legitimately
recognized sources of international law upon which to reason
through its decision.121 Arguably, part of the reason why the ICTR
was willing and able to do this originated in the judges’
recognition that their time to curb the ‘volcano’ of state sovereignty
and impunity to jus cogens was limited because the Tribunal was
an impermanent structure.
The ICTR was perhaps also
emboldened by the understanding that its decisions and lawmaking, though otherwise a significant incursion upon the
sovereignty of states, was unlikely to be seen by the most powerful
state actors (i.e., the permanent members of the Security Council)
as a direct transgression on their sovereignty. These powerful state
actors likely saw themselves as far removed—and as a practical
matter immune—from the ICTR’s new jurisprudence because of
the particular context within which it was being developed.122 The
118 Id. See also Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 631, 640–41 (2005) (exploring three kinds of judicial lawmaking: explicit delegation, implicit delegation, and non-consensual).
119 See Ginsburg, note 118, at 641.
120 Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV.
429, 469–70 (2004).
121 Swart, supra note 116, at 476.
122 Various scholars have argued that the (generous) funding of the Tribunals
by the Security Council, relative to other international courts and tribunals, suggest that powerful permanent states of the Security Council do not perceive these
Tribunals as a threat to their interests. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 118, at 666–
67; Eric Posner & John Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 68 (2005) (discussing the difference between the ICC, which is independent of the United Nations Security Council, and the ICTR, which was cre-
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salience of the context thus also animated the court to take the
creative risks that it did. On the other hand, the body of
international criminal law called for the development of highly
specific rules and principles, which the ICTR judges had an
unprecedented opportunity to advance through the context of the
cases they were deciding.
The closure of the ICTR and other ad hoc courts such as the
ICTY also gives rise to the structural challenges of managing
ongoing legal and moral obligations to those whose interests
continue long after the Tribunal’s close—the so-called ‘residual’
responsibilities and affirmative duties.123 At the outset, it was not
immediately clear that a ‘residual’ mechanism would be the
natural vehicle by which the Tribunals would transfer and wrap
up their work. The two options before the Security Council may
logically have been either to refer all cases—even ongoing ones—to
their national jurisdictions of Rwanda or Yugoslavia, or to leave
the Tribunals ‘standing’ with their structures intact and make
appropriate adjustments to their budget and administration.124
However, the Security Council instead selected the option of
creating a historically innovative ‘residual’ structure.125 This
decision is perhaps due in part to perceived Tribunal legacy
contributions to the development of the international rule of law,
as a result of which, the international community had become
’accustomed‘ to the Tribunal’s continuing presence. The Tribunal
therefore could not “simply shut down from one day to the next,”
and yet, this consideration had to be weighed against the need to

ated by the Security Council). Moreover, that the Tribunals have limited subject
matter and temporal jurisdictions whose targets are individuals in failed or weak
states, would suggest that the Tribunals’ decisions were not threatening to powerful state actors. Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter
or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 780 (2006) (“ICT
[International Criminal Tribunal] prosecutions will be directed almost exclusively
at individuals engaged in civil conflict within weak or failing states.”).
123 See Reiger, supra note 19, at 1. See Thomas Wayde Pittman, The Road to the
Establishment of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals: From
Completion to Continuation, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 797, 805 (2011) (describing the limited expected lifespan of the Tribunal and arguing that the meaning of its legacy
will include its residual function connotations).
124 Guido Acquaviva, Was a Residual Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals Really Necessary?, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 789, 793–95 (2011).
125 Neither the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT) nor the US
Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMT) had established a separate structure for its
‘residual’ work. Id. at 791–93.
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economize on Tribunal costs.126 Therefore, the solution the
Security Council created was a “small, temporary and efficient
structure, whose functions and size will diminish over time, with a
small number of staff commensurate with its reduced functions.”127
In December 2008, the Secretary General identified several core
functions such a residual structure for the ICTR and ICTY would
have to fulfill: trying fugitives and contempt cases, protecting
witnesses, reviewing judgments, enforcing sentences, assisting and
referring cases to national jurisdictions, and housing and
maintaining archives.128 In light of the Mechanism’s essential
functions, its name—‘residual’ Mechanism—is somewhat
misleading.129 The articulation and adoption of a completion
strategy by the ICTR was a necessary step in concluding its
mandate. However, the specific provisions incorporated into the
Completion Strategy have subjected the Tribunal to criticism,
leaving some scholars to argue that the process of justice has been
superseded by the need for judicial economy.130
The formulation of the residual Mechanism was officially
established a decade into the Tribunal’s existence, in Security
Council Resolution 1503 of 2003. This Resolution incorporated the
two strategies articulated by then-ICTR President Claude Jorda,
focusing on the most senior level perpetrators while concurrently
strengthening local judges and courts.131 A year later, in March
2004, the Security Council, in adopting Resolution 1534, provided
for a review of caseloads with “a view to determining which cases
should be proceeded with and which should be transferred to

Id. at 795.
S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 5, ¶ 7.
128 Id. at 3. See Catherine Denis, Critical Overview of the ‘Residual Functions’ of
the Mechanism and its Date of Commencement (including Transitional Arrangements), 9
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 819 (2011) (assessing in-depth the eight functions of the residual
Mechanism, including trial of fugitives; trial of contempt cases; protection of witnesses; review of judgments; referral of cases to national jurisdictions; enforcement of sentences; assistance to national authorities and management of the Tribunal’s archives).
129 Ruth Frolich, Introductory Note to the UN Security Council Resolution 1966:
International Residual Mechanism for the ICTY and ICTY, 50 I.L.M. 323, 323 (2011).
130 Laura Bingham, Strategy or Process? Closing the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 687, 689 (2006).
131 Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial Effects of the “Completion Strategies” on the Ad
Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 143 (2005); S.C. Res.
1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503, ¶ 7 (Aug. 28, 2003).
126
127
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competent national jurisdictions.”132
This Security Council
Resolution also stipulated a deadline for the Tribunal’s work, along
with half-yearly mandatory reporting requirements “setting out
the progress made towards implementation of the Completion
Strategy of the Tribunal, explaining what measures have been
taken and what measures remain to be taken.”133 This stringent
focus on deadlines has led one concerned observer to critique that
the ad hoc Tribunal Completion Strategies
reflect a lack of value for the host of implicit social and
political functions not enumerated in the [promulgating]
Statutes. By setting these functions aside in favor of a
strategic model that invites equating closure with docket
clearing, the various authors of the Completion Strategies
risk wagering the legacy of the Tribunals on the ability to
meet deadlines.134
The national referral strategy embodied in the Security Council
Resolutions was realized in June 2011, when the ICTR transferred
its first case, that of Jean-Bosco Uwinkindi, to Rwanda after the
panel of judges decided that the Government of Rwanda was
“prepared to receive its first referral.”135 Eventually, the legitimacy

S.C. Res. 1534, supra note 5, ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 6.
134 Bingham, supra note 130.
135 Uwinkindi’s transfer occurred despite amici briefs submitted by Human
Rights Watch, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, and the International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association who all raised concerns indicating that witness intimidation by the Government of Rwanda was widespread
and prevalent, and infringed on defendants’ rights to a fair trial. Uwinkindi’s trial
in Rwanda has not started as of the publication of this Comment. His lead defense counsel has raised concerns over the lack of governmental funding and legal
aid to mount his defense, including expenses for the hiring of investigative personnel and identifying and presenting potential witnesses. The ICTR has, in total,
transferred eight cases to Rwanda, with the last on June 28, 2012. In this last decision, the Referral Chamber “expresse[d] its solemn hope that the Republic of
Rwanda, in accepting referrals from this Tribunal, will actualise in practice the
commitments it has made about its good faith, capacity and willingness to enforce
the highest standards of international justice in the referred cases.” Munyarugarama, Case No. ICTR-02-79-R11bis, Referral Proceedings Pursuant To Rule 11
Bis, ¶ 69 (June 28, 2012). See Press Release, ICTR, Case of Jean Uwinkindi Referred
for Trial to the Republic of Rwanda, ICTR/INFO-9-2-6811.EN (June 28, 2011),
available at http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=1216; Prosecutor
v. Jean Uwinkindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (June 28, 2011); Uwinkindi Trial Postponed on Constitutional Challenge, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 18, 2013),
132
133
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of the process by which Uwinkindi’s trial, and that of others, is
conducted by the government of Rwanda will, by extension, reflect
on the Tribunal’s ability to secure the highest standard of
international due process and fairness for all of those who have
appeared before it, and thereby indirectly impact its legacy.
Finally, Security Council Resolution 1966 in December 2010
officially established the Mechanism for International Criminal
Tribunals (MICT) with two branches.136 The Arusha Branch of the
Tribunal’s residual Mechanism officially began its work in July
2012.137 The Mechanism is self-described as a “new small,
temporary and efficient body, tasked with continuing the
‘jurisdiction, rights and obligations and essential functions’ of the
ICTR and the ICTY; and maintaining the legacy of both
institutions.”138 So far, the Arusha branch has been designated as
fully functional and has begun issuing orders and decisions.139 The
management of the remaining issues of the Tribunal’s functions by
the innovative and untested structure of the Mechanism will
impact its legacy as demonstrative of how it ended its work, and

http://www.hirondellenews.org/ictr-rwanda/409-rwanda-justice/34038-180113rwandajustice-uwinkindi-trial-postponed-on-constitutional-challenge; Kigali Denies Lack of Funds for Uwinkindi Defence, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (Sept. 16, 2012),
http://www.hirondellenews.org/ictr-rwanda/current-cases/uwinkindi-jeanbosco/33799-160912-rwandaictr-kigali-denies-lack-of-funds-for-uwinkindidefence; Press Release, ICTR, Munyarugarama Case Transferred to Rwanda,
ICTR/INFO-9-2-724.EN
(June
28,
2012),
available
at
http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=1294; Uwinkindi Transfer to
be “Robustly Monitored,” says ICTR, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (Apr. 21, 2012),
http://www.hirondellenews.org/ictr-rwanda/342-current-cases/uwinkindijean-bosco/33069-210412-ictrrwanda-uwinkindi-transfer-to-be-robustlymonitored-says-ictr.
136 S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 5, ¶ 6; Frolich, supra note 129.
137 See S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 5; U.N. MECHANISM FOR INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, http://www.unmict.org (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). The
Hague Branch of the Mechanism will take on the functions of the ICTY on July 1,
2013.
138 U.N. MECHANISM FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 137.
139 Judge Theodor Meron, President of the Mechanism for Int’l Criminal Tribunals & President of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Remarks to the U.N. Sec. Council (Dec. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.unmict.org/files/statements/121205_president_meron_ny_sc_en.pd
f; Letter from the President of the Int’l Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals to the President of the Sec. Council (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.unmict.org/
files/documents/progress_reports/121116_progress_report_en.pdf
(describing
the commencement of operations at Arusha branch including functions and plans
for new permanent premises of the Arusha branch).
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whether, in the last leg of the process, it did so in a manner that
consolidates its contributions. As one scholar notes, “[t]he legacy
and judicial integrity of the time-limited international and hybrid
criminal tribunals depend on these residual functions being
addressed effectively.”140 This area of the Tribunal’s structural
legacy will continue to unfold in the years ahead.
5.

MEMORIAL LEGACY: TOWARDS A RE-IMAGINED COLLECTIVE
NARRATIVE

Collective memory consists “of the stories a society tells about
momentous events in its history, the events that most profoundly
affect the lives of its members and most arouse their passions for
long periods.”141 This category of events includes genocides as
well as the legal proceedings arising from such an event.142
Professor Martha Minow, in writing about remembering the past
in order to prevent atrocities in the future, notes:
It is here—in resisting narratives of collective guilt and
producing a different sort of collective memory—that
international criminal trials . . . can be of value. The task is
to help the society—and the watching world—not merely
recall but also re-member, that is, to reconstitute a
community of humanity against which there can be crimes
(hence, “crimes against humanity”), and within which
victims and survivors can be reclaimed as worthy
members.143
As another scholar also notes:
As an aim for criminal law, the cultivation of collective
memory resembles deterrence in that it is directed toward
the future, where enhanced solidarity is sought. But like
retribution, it looks to the past, to provide the narrative
content of what is to be shared in memory.144

140 Valerie Oosterveld, International Law and the Closure of the International and
Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 37, 37 (2010).
141 Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 463, 475 (1995).
142 Id.
143 Martha Minow, The Work of Re-Membering: After Genocide and Mass Atrocity, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 429, 430 (1999).
144 Osiel, supra note 141, at 474.
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Trials are necessarily an imperfect vehicle for creating
narratives—they are adversarial and often elicit constructed and
rehearsed narratives.145 Specific to the ICTR, they are also biased in
their selection of witnesses and subjects in that only those most
responsible for the genocide will appear before the court.146
Anthropologist Nigel Eltringham argues, after viewing courtroom
proceedings at the Tribunal and interviewing defense and
prosecution counsels and judges at the ICTR, that witnesses and
defendants are subjected to “coercive, enticed remembering,” a
project where “the lawyer, judge, Truth Commissioner and
historian are all artisans of memory, imposing ‘temporal causal
sequencing [that] makes sense of action.’”147 His critique of the
historical record generated by courts, and the Tribunal in
particular, is of the law’s revision of the record through judicial
review, thereby potentially “re-configur[ing]” how history is read
in the future.148 He also critiques the sheer volume of material
generated by the Tribunal and questions how it will be accessible
to future “consumers.”149
Minow acknowledges that the use of trials to help society
remember may render tribunals vulnerable to the charge of
deliberate myth-making to “the point of rendering the distinction
between truth and falsity problematic,” but she credits Professor
Mark Osiel with the defense that such lengths are nevertheless
justified.150 According to Osiel, writing history and influencing
collective memory is necessary.151 He argues that the “process of
ideological construction need not be illegitimate, nor necessarily
accomplished by sleight of hand. In aspiring to infuse liberal
memory, judges may justifiably construe the record of administrative
massacre to tell a compelling story vindicating the preeminent liberal

Bingham, supra note 130, at 700.
See Minow, supra note 143, at 431 (“[T]rial forces those individuals selected
for prosecution to serve as central, larger-than-life characters, who stand in for all
the numerous others who could not be found, or who could not feasibly be tried if
the nation is to go on to any future.”).
147 Nigel Eltringham, “We are not a Truth Commission”: Fragmented Narratives
and the Historical Record at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 11 J.
GENOCIDE RES. 55, 60 (2009).
148 Id. at 69.
149 Id. at 73.
150 Minow, supra note 143, at 46.
151 See generally Osiel, supra note 141, at 463.
145
146
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virtue: respect for the moral rights of individuals.”152 Whether the
historical record generated by the Tribunal is incomplete, or too
voluminous, it is now a record for the annals of history. Journalist
Philip Gourevitch, in his interviews with Rwandans in the
immediate days after the genocide, pointed out that he “felt that
these stories were offered to [him] the way that shipwrecked
people, neither drowned nor saved, send messages in bottles: in
the hope that, even if the legends they carry can do the teller no
good, they may at some other time be of use to somebody,
somewhere else.”153
An important part of the Tribunal’s memorial legacy is its
archives, which are sometimes said to be the physical
manifestation of society’s collective memory, subject to responsible
storage and collection for its future interpreters and narrators.154
The Security Council and ICTR itself recognize the existence of
such a legacy in the Tribunal’s archives.155 Indeed, the ICTR’s
Mechanism spends much of its time strategizing over how to best
preserve the records, where they should be located, and how and
to whom access should be granted.156 The Tribunal’s recordkeeping is innovative and has broken new ground in techniques
for management, despite its initial logistical hiccups.157
The records of the ICTR hold the nearly 900,000 pages of
transcripts and audio and video recordings of more than 6,000 trial
days, more than 10,000 interlocutory decisions, and the judgments

Id. at 647 (emphasis added).
GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 183.
154 Kenneth E. Foote, To Remember and Forget: Archives, Memory, and Culture,
53 AMER. ARCHIVIST 378, 378 (1990).
155 Press Release, General Assembly, Budget Committee Takes Up Proposed
2010-2011 Financing for International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda, Former
Yugoslavia, U.N. Press Release GA/AB/3936 (Dec. 10, 2009) (noting that the
physical archive will “facilitate ongoing and future prosecutions [and] serve as a
historic record”).
156 See, e.g., Tom A. Adami & Martha Hunt, Genocidal Archives: The African
Context—Genocide in Rwanda, 26 J. SOC’Y OF ARCHIVISTS 105 (2005); Timothy Gallimore, The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and its
Contributions to Reconciliation in Rwanda, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 239
(2008); Tom A. Adami, The Management of International Criminal Justice Records: The
Case of Rwandan Tribunal, 13 AFR. J. LIBR. 1 (2003); Tom A. Adami, “Who will be left
to tell the tale?” Recordkeeping and International Criminal Jurisprudence, 7 ARCHIVAL
SCI. 213 (2007).
157 Adami, “Who will be left to tell the tale?,”supra note 156.
152
153
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of all the accused.158 This collection includes the records of the
Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry, under
which include the records of the ICTR detention facility in Arusha
and the highly sensitive records of the Witnesses and Victims
Support Section (WVSS), Gender Advisory Unit, and related ICTR
Kigali medical unit. All of these require special protection in their
retention.159 However, despite Security Council Resolution 1966
stipulating that the archives of the ICTR (and ICTY) remain the
property of the United Nations and be “inviolable wherever
located,” their final site of location has not yet been determined.160
Security Council Resolution 1966 is to be reviewed in 2014, and in
this interim period, the residual Mechanism is responsible for and
has assumed the management of the archives.161 Alarmingly,
Rwanda’s bid for custody of the ICTR archives has recently gained
momentum with support of the East African Community (EAC).162
In October 2012, the EAC Secretary General, Dr. Richard Sezibera,
sent a letter to the United Nations supporting Rwanda’s hosting of
the archives.163 “It would not be fair for the documents of the
Genocide that happened in Rwanda to be hosted in Arusha,” EAC
Minister Monique Mukaruliza noted in a December 2012 Press
Conference in Nairobi.164
The fight for control of the ICTR’s archives is, in some ways, a
“battle to control the future.”165 As historians Joan M. Schwartz
Address to the United Nations Sec. Council, supra note 10.
Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Temporary Courts, Permanent Records (Woodrow
Wilson Ctr. for Scholars, Hist. & Pub. Pol’y Prog. Occasional Paper, 2008), available
at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/TCPR_Peterson_HAPPOP0
2.pdf.
160 S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 5, Art. 27.1, ¶ 1.
161 U.N. Security Council to Decide Fate of Rwanda Tribunal Archives’ Fate, says
Official, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.hirondellenews.
org/ictr-rwanda/404-ictr-institutional-news/33682-050912-unmict-un-securitycouncil-to-decide-final-destination-of-ictr-archives.
162 Rodrigue Rwirahira, Push for Custody of ICTR Archives Gathers Momentum,
THE EAST AFRICAN (Dec. 7, 2012, 7:56 PM), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/
Rwanda/News/Push-for-custody-of-ICTR-archives-gathers-momentum//1433218/1639028/-/oliptuz/-/index.html.
163 Letter from the Secretary-General [East African Community] to the President of the Security Council (Oct. 18, 2002), http://www.securitycouncilreport.
org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2012_779.pdf.
164 Eric Kabeera, EAC Backs Rwanda to Host ICTR Archives, THE SUNDAY TIMES
Dec. 2, 2012, http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=15194&a=13081.
165 ICTR Archives: The Battle to Control the Future, YOUTUBE, http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=AZhWihjMPMs (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
158
159
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and Terry Cook have argued, “[t]hrough archives, the past is
controlled.
Certain stories are privileged and others
166
Schwartz and Cook equate archives with
marginalized.”
collective memory and the human identity.167 Archives as records
exercise power over the “shape and direction of historical
scholarship, collective memory, and national identity.”168 Archives
become institutions when they wield power over the
administrative, legal, and fiscal accountability of governments and
engage in powerful public policy debates.169 Control of the ICTR
archives equates to symbolic and physical control of the past and a
roadmap for the future. As early as March 2010, an Expert Group
Meeting had recognized the vital importance of securing the
Tribunal’s archives. Its final report noted the “need to retain an
accessible archive which will notably assist to prevent historical
revisionism in the affected regions and therefore avoid fuelling
future conflict.”170 In fact, this report devoted a specific section to
the special considerations involving the ICTR archives, which are
“essential to the long-term memory or memorialization of the
conflict.”171
Since the late 1990’s, Rwanda has embarked on a national
reconciliation program that protects the singular narrative of
Rwandan genocide history as disseminated by its victorious RPFdominated government.172 This skewed narrative discounts the
participation of the RPF in atrocities committed during the
genocide and their violations of international humanitarian law. It
purports to erase differences in ethnic identities as an essential
element of institutionalizing the hegemonic power aspirations of a

166 Joan M. Schwartz & Terry Cook, Archives, Records, and Power: The Making
of Modern Memory, 2 ARCHIVAL SCI. 1, 1–2 (2002).
167 Id.
168 Id. at 2.
169 Id. at 1–2.
170 FINAL REPORT OF THE EXPERT GROUP MEETING ON “CLOSING THE
INTERNATIONAL AND HYBRID CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: MECHANISMS TO ADDRESS
RESIDUAL ISSUES” 1, 2 (2010).
171 Id. at 5.
172 JENNIFER MELVIN, BEYOND THE VENEER OF RECONCILIATION: HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DEMOCRACY IN RWANDA (2012). See also RWANDA NATIONAL UNITY AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, http://www.nurc.gov.rw (last visited Apr. 5, 2013);
Chi Mgbako, Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in
Post-Genocide Rwanda, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 201 (2005).
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minority Tutsi elite.173 It is perpetuated through the indoctrination
of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans in mandatory live-in
solidarity educations camps (ingandos), civic education camps, and
preserved by gacaca courts.174 The Rwandan national reconciliation
program is only part of the dictatorship government’s overall
strategy of deliberate and skillful manipulation of its historical
narrative to suit current regime interests.175 The ICTR’s archives,
as the (albeit imperfect) records for the continuing construction of
universal collective memory narratives of accountability and
responsibility, should not be held hostage to a regime that has
tried—and thus far with success—to extinguish inconvenient
truths of the crimes it committed against humanity under the
shadow of the genocide.
6. SYMBOLIC LEGACY
While defining ‘symbolism’ is not an easy task, Professor Barry
O’Neill identifies three categories of symbols prevalent in
international relations, of which two are relevant here: ‘message’
symbols and ‘value’ symbols.176
Message symbols are
communicative acts by which the sender intends for the receiver to
follow a sequence of logic to arrive at a belief or action.177 Value
symbols are defined by the strong attitudes generated by the ideas
they represent, and “unite [] various ideas under one cognitive
entity.”178 It is one where “the symbol itself comes to be valued by
the group.”179 The categories of symbolism are not exclusive, and
sometimes the same event will involve several symbols, for
example, where the “emotional power of value symbols promotes
their use as message symbols . . . .”180 This Part argues that the

173 MELVIN, supra note 172, at 3–4; Filip Reyntjens, Constructing the Truth,
Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda,
110 AFR. AFF. 1, 30–31 (2011).
174 Id.
175 Reyntjens, supra note 173, at 26–34.
176 BARRY O’NEILL, HONOR, SYMBOLS, AND WAR 3–8 (1999).
177 Id. at 6–7.
178 Id. at 7. O’Neill uses the example of a national flag which “represents its
country in the geographical sense, as well as its history, culture, and institutions.”
Id.
179 Id. (emphasis added).
180 Id.
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ICTR has evolved from focusing on message symbolism to
emphasizing value symbolism.
Message symbolism of the law is in many ways similar to the
‘expressive function’ of the law. Professor Cass Sunstein defines
this ‘expressive function’ as “making statements” that may be
designed to change social norms, rather than controlling behavior
directly.181 Specifically, he notes that the expressive function of the
law can be understood in two different ways: first, as a
“statement” about the propriety or impropriety of certain acts or
behavior, employed to shape social norms that ultimately influence
judgment and behavior; and second, as a function of interest and
commitment to integrity.182 The latter refers to the social meaning
of conduct and embodies the idea that “[t]he expressive dimension
of action can [itself] be an important reason for action.”183 Criminal
law, he notes, “is a prime arena for the expressive function of
law.”184
Here, arguably, the ‘legal’ establishment of the Tribunal by the
Security Council was an expressive function of international law
meant to communicate a message and serve as a symbol.185 During
Security Council deliberations leading to the establishment of the
ICTR, various Members had voiced reasons for the creation of an
international tribunal, including that “the establishment of the
Tribunal is a clear message that the international community is not
prepared to leave unpunished the grave crimes committed in
Rwanda.”186
The messaging function communicated by the
establishment of the Tribunal under the legally binding force of
Chapter VII was unequivocal: perpetrators of the genocide will be
brought to justice under the mantle of a universal moral authority,
wherever in the world they may be shrouded.

181 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2024–25 (1996).
182 Id. at 2025–27.
183 Id. at 2027.
184 Id. at 2044.
185 For a discussion of whether the Security Council makes international law,
see Tono Eitel, The UN Security Council and its Future Contribution in the Field of International Law, 4 MAX PLANCK U.N.Y.B. 53, 60–61 (2000) (arguing that the Security
Council makes “Council Law” through the part of their Resolutions that claim
binding force, and that “Council Law” should be in the same class as “Treaty
Law” and “Court Law”).
186 U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, supra note 28 (providing a statement of the Argentinian delegate) (emphasis added).
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[O]ne aim of the Tribunals at the time of creation involved
not the reality but the image of a tribunal—the semaphoric
weight of the institution in the abstract. . . . [T]he Tribunals
themselves, at the time of creation, validated international
rules proscribing genocide with a seat of judicial process.
In this way, because the rules preceded the Tribunals,
creating fora for judicial reckoning had the important effect
of stamping international rules with authority.187
The unanimity needed to symbolically communicate the
international and universal character of the condemnation may be
one reason that delegates during the Security Council deliberations
were so concerned about Rwanda’s refusal to ratify the
Resolution,188 and might also help to explain why every member of
the Security Council went on to ratify the Resolution, except for
China, which abstained.189 As the representative from the United
Kingdom stated, “My Government regrets that Rwanda felt
compelled to vote against the draft resolution . . . [b]ut it was
essential to maintain in the statute and in the resolution the
international character of the Tribunal . . . .”190 Symbolic too was
the deliberate location of the Tribunal on the African continent and
in Arusha, Tanzania—where the Peace Accords of 1993 were
signed between the RPF and the then-government of Rwanda—as
the hope for peace and international commitment to justice in that
small and remote corner of East Africa.191
Over time, the Tribunal’s symbolism has taken on a larger life.
Given the body of substantive criminal and humanitarian law the
Tribunal has generated, the Tribunal’s performance and rendition
of justice, the interpretive narratives it generated, and ultimately its
very presence as an active international criminal court prosecuting
Bingham, supra note 130, at 690–91.
Mr. Keating, delegate from New Zealand, noted that “[o]rdinary people
the world over will not understand if the Government of Rwanda turns its back
on the efforts of the United Nations to ensure that the trial and punishment of the
perpetrators of genocide take place.” U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, supra note 28, at 301.
189 Id. at 305 (statement of Chinese delegate discussing China’s reasons for
abstaining from voting).
190 Id. at 301–02 (statement of the delegate from the United Kingdom).
191 THIERRY CRUVELLIER, COURT OF REMORSE: INSIDE THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 7 (Chari Voss trans., 2010) (2006) (“The link between Nuremberg and Arusha cannot be easily denied, except perhaps in the
symbolism. . . . Arusha was a symbol of peace, and the UN tribunal was an attempt to restore it in the eyes of its creators.”)
187
188
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those most responsible for the 1994 atrocities in Rwanda, the
Tribunal is far more than the sum of its parts.192 The ideas and
ideals the Tribunal represents have generated strong attitudes and
emotions, and it may now be valued as symbols of much more:
It is this symbolic function of the Tribunals, so apparent in
the rhetoric of their creation, that is most threatened by the
prospect of their permanent closure. In other words, not
only will the Tribunals no longer be “out there,” they also
face the difficult task of closing without unraveling or
distorting their role as a “symbolic validation” of the
international community’s commitment to bringing war
criminals to justice.193
Perhaps the ICTR will best be remembered as, and best symbolizes,
the moral response of this generation tested after having once
vowed “never again.”194
7.

CONCLUSION

For nearly two decades, the ICTR has held a grip on the public
imagination as the physical manifestation of the international
search for justice and accountability after one of history’s worst
atrocities. Its work in a remote corner of East Africa in the shadow
of Mount Meru has not gone unnoticed: to Rwandans, this search
for justice may have been fraught with tension as the ICTR seemed
to fail in garnering justice for those victims of RPF atrocities in a
society that has become more divided and politicized since the
genocide. To the international community, this search for justice
came at a high price, after long trials of patience over the obstacles

192 See, e.g., Derrick Alan Everett, Public Narratives + Reparations in Rwanda:
On the Potential of Film as Promoter of International Human Rights + Reconciliation, 7
NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 103, 127 (2009) (arguing that in the movie Sometimes in April
“[s]uch an image of the actual ICTR courts can be profoundly positive for those
who have lost faith in justice, because it shows a functioning international legal
justice system in which accused genocidaires [sic] suffer from the ramifications of
their actions”).
193 Bingham, supra note 130, at 691 (internal citation omitted).
194 See David Rieff, The Persistence of Genocide, 165 POL’Y REV. 29, 29 (2011),
available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/64261
(noting that the phase “Never Again” has become a “kind of shorthand for the
remembrance of the Shoah [Holocaust],” and because of the continued persistence
of genocide, currently also for “any great crime against humanity that could not
be prevented”).
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created both by Rwanda and by the Tribunal’s own shortcomings
in anticipating the organizational needs of a vast international
justice organ with little prior precedent to emulate.
It is possible, as some commentators have argued, that the
Tribunal was set up to salvage the international community’s guilt
at standing by while one of history’s worst atrocities unfolded, that
is, as a self-serving moral salvo.195 It is a fact that through most of
its lifespan, the enormous cost—often crudely calculated as the cost
spent by the international community per conviction—has
accumulated to more than an estimated $1.4 billion to the
international community,196 and that it overran its substantial
budget multiple times.197 It is also the case that the Tribunal has
struggled with very public staffing and management issues for the
first several years of its existence.198 In short, justice at the Tribunal
may have been expensive and time-consuming.199 International
tribunals like the ICTR “are not cheap and the beginning models
may not be the best,” but they hold the promise that international
humanitarian norms may be strengthened and rendered
enforceable.200 Despite these realities and shortcomings, this
Comment has argued that the Tribunal’s impact has been
profound.
The Tribunal’s legacy to international criminal and
humanitarian law, both central to the protection of contemporary
international human rights, is undeniable, and may not even be
fully appreciated as central to our current understanding. Less

U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, supra note 28, at 308.
International Justice: In the Dock, but for What?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2010,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/17572645?story_id=17572645. See
also, David Wippman, The Costs of International Justice, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 861 (2006)
(comparing the costs of criminal prosecutions at the ICTY and the ICTR to those
in the United States). Wippman notes that “[t]he perception that international
criminal trials are costly and slow is accurate but misleading. On average, ICTY
trials do cost much more than an average criminal trial in the United States. But
the reasons relate principally to the inherent complexity of the cases being tried,
the dependence of the Tribunal on international cooperation, and the costs implicit in its international nature (including translation and travel).” Id. at 880.
197 See Wippman, supra note 196 (describing the costs of ICTR trials).
198 See YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AGAINST IMPUNITY: PROGRESS
AND NEW CHALLENGES 99–100 (2005) (describing the ICTR’s initial staffing and logistical problems).
199
Patricia M. Wald, Punishment of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 69
SOC. RES. 1119, 1122–23 (2002).
200 Id. at 1134.
195
196
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recognized are the Tribunal’s multiple other legacies in the
precedential value of its structure, in its poignant memorial
function, and in its indeterminable symbolic value. The Tribunal’s
structural legacy is one in the making, as its residual Mechanism
comes to fulfill the Tribunal’s concluding processes in the years
ahead. The Tribunal’s memorial function has since shaped a
collective narrative of the genocide that acknowledges guilt, but
moves beyond it to vindicate the triumph of a universal search for
justice, whose legacy continues to evolve as the Tribunal’s
voluminous record is preserved for future historians. Finally, the
Tribunal’s symbolic legacy may be one of its most enduring
features: it has come, over the course of its life, to epitomize justice
and the fight against the impunity of those who would commit the
most egregious crimes against humanity; and it has garnered the
hope that its end may have been replaced with something more
enduring in the continuing struggle to protect human rights
around the world.
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